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NEED A CHRISTIAN BE A MIND /BODY DUALIST? 
Lynne Rudder Baker 
Although prominent Christian theologians and philosophers have assumed 
the truth of mind/body dualism, I want to raise the question of whether the 
Christian ought to be a mind/body dualist. First, I sketch a picture of mind, 
and of human persons, that is not a form of mind/body dualism. Then, I 
argue that the nondualistic picture is compatible with a major traditional 
Christian doctrine, the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Finally, I 
suggest that if a Christian need not be a mind/body dualist, then she should 
not be a mind/body dualist. 
Dualism of body and soul, or of body and mind, permeates Western 
thought. Many prominent Christian theologians have assumed the truth 
of mind/body dualism: Augustine, Anselm, Luther, Calvin, and in a dif-
ferent respect, apparently Thomas Aquinas.1 So, in addition to its distin-
guished philosophical lineage-through Plato and Descartes-
mind/body dualism has venerable credentials in the history of Christian 
thought. Nevertheless, even while respecting the tradition, we can go on 
to ask: Does Christian doctrine entail mind/body dualism? Need a 
Christian be a mind/body dualist? 
The answer partly depends, of course, on what is meant by 
"mind/body dualism," and by what is meant by "Christian." As I am 
using the terms here, a Christian affirms traditional Christian doctrines-
such as the two-natures doctrine of Christ and the doctrine of the resurrec-
tion of the body. And mind/body dualism is the thesis that human per-
sons have non-bodily parts-immaterial souls-that can exist indepen-
dently of any body. According to mind/body dualism, if Jane is a human 
person living in Canada, she has a body, but Jane's existence does not 
depend on her having the body that she has or on her having any body at 
all: If mind/body dualism is correct, even though she is now embodied, 
Jane could exist as a purely immaterial being. 
Very tentatively, I shall offer some reasons to deny that a Christian 
need be, or even should be, a mind/body dualist. I shall sketch a picture 
of mind, and of human persons, that is not a form of mind/body dualism; 
then, I shall argue not only that the nondualistic picture is consistent with 
Christian doctrine, but also that it fits quite comfortably within a Christian 
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outlook and is philosophically superior to mind/body dualism. Finally, I 
shall conclude with some methodological reflections. 
Persons ilnd Their Bodies 
Materialism dominates contemporary philosophy. On the standard 
materialistic view in the philosophy of mind, mental states are brain 
states. The only alternative, it is assumed, is to construe mental states as 
states of a nonbodily entity, an immaterial soul, and this is to endorse 
mind/body dualism-a doctrine now widely regarded as untenable. A 
little reflection, however, shows the dichotomy-mental states as brain 
states or mental states as immaterial-soul states-to be a false one. For 
there is another alternative, which elsewhere I call "Practical Realism," 
that stands in contrast to the Standard View: According to Practical 
Realism, mental states-like beliefs, desires, and intentions-are rather 
states of the whole person-person-states, as it were, not states of any par-
ticular organ or proper part of a person.2 
Persons have beliefs; brains have neural states. Having certain neural 
states is (presumably) a necessary condition for persons to have beliefs; 
but it does not follow that for each belief ;that a person has, there is a neur-
al state that is identical to (or that constitutes) that belief. Compare: 
Beavers build dams; jaws have mandibular states. Having certain jaw 
states is (presumably) necessary for beavers to build dams; but it does not 
follow that for each dam a beaver builds, there is a mandibular state that 
is identical to (or that constitutes) the building of the dam. 
What believing is, I am convinced, cannot be described or explained in 
terms free of reference to intentional states; nonetheless, illuminating 
things may be said about belief. Whether or not S believes that p depends 
solely on what S would do, say and think in various circumstances. 
(Doing and saying cannot be understood by anyone who doesn't already 
understand belief.) Although S may not always manifest her belief in 
behavior, if S believes that p, there must be circumstances in which S's 
belief that p would make a difference to what S would do, say or think-
where what S does, says or thinks may be specified by ordinary descrip-
tions of actions, such as "answer the letter," "invite the neighbors," "buy 
the blue one," and so on. Conversely, if relevant counterfactuals are true 
of S, then S believes that p-whether or not S acknowledges having that 
belief, or even realizes that she has it. Even if there is no noncircular 
account of belief in general, a particular person's having a particular belief 
is explainable in terms of the counterfactuals relevant to that person's hav-
ing that belief. (There are complex issues about identifying the relevant 
counterfactuals for S's having a certain belief, but these are beyond the 
scope of this paperY A person believes that foxes have tails if and only if 
relevant (intentionally specified) counterfactuals are true-independently 
of how the brain is organized. Perhaps the relevant counterfactuals are 
true only of those with certain kind of brain functioning in a certain way, 
but it does not follow that beliefs lire brain states. Since the term "belief" is 
just a nominalization of "believes that," we should not think of beliefs as 
particular internal states of an organ like the brain. 
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Someone may object that to have the relevant counterfactuals true of 
one simply is to be in a certain state; and the only candidates for such 
states are brain states or soul states. I think that the objection is misguided. 
For the kind of state required for the counterfactuals to be true is not any 
particular internal state, but a state in an extended sense. My "state" in 
virtue of which it is true that I would lend you money for lunch if you 
asked me depends on my being embedded in a certain social and linguis-
tic environment. There is no good reason to identify such a state with par-
ticular state of one's brain. Similarly for belief states. The reality of belief 
does not depend on the term "belieflf's denoting a kind of spatiotemporal 
entity or of a particular internal state. One's state of believing that p 
depends on global properties (including relational properties, and proper-
ties about what would happen in various counterfactual circumstances) of 
whole organisms. 
The reason, I think, that it is appropriate to construe mental states as 
global states is that it is the person, the whole person and not just her 
brain, who is an agent.' Having attitudes enables persons to do things that 
otherwise could not be done. In a world without attitudes, there would be 
no such thing as befriending, or insulting, or obeying, or paying bills, or 
having parties, or many of the other things that make up human life. 
Beliefs and desires are on a par with the actions that they make possible. 
Just as Joan's promising to pick up a colleague's mail is a property of a 
person, not of a mouth, so too is her believing that she will be able to find 
the colleague's mailbox a property of a person, not of a brain. In short, 
beliefs and desires are not spatiotemporal entities that have causal pow-
ers; rather, persons have causal powers in virtue of having beliefs and 
desires. The relevant entities are person, not attitudes. 
If beliefs and desires are not spatiotemporal entities, yet believing and 
desiring are real properties of persons, then it might seem that I have 
exchanged substance dualism, as found in Descartes and Plato, for a more 
up-to-date property dualism. I resist this description, because I think that 
property dualism is in the same philosophical camp as both substance 
dualism and mind/brain identity theories. For according to property 
dualism, there are two fundamental kinds of properties-mental and 
physical-that in some way determine all other properties. I no more 
think that there are two kinds of fundamental properties than I think that 
there is one kind of fundamental property. There are many kinds of prop-
erties (social, legal, moral, aesthetic, artifactual, and on and on), and it 
seems to me highly unlikely that there is a single relation-supervenience, 
reduction, or anything else--in terms of which all properties are connect-
ed to one or two kinds of fundamental property. Hence, I reject property-
dualism along with substance-dualism and mind/brain identity theories. 
But my main point in this section is that beliefs and desires are not states 
of brains or of souls, but of persons. This point makes acute the question: 
What is a person? 
In the first instance, a person (human or not) is a being with a capacity 
for certain intentional states like believing, desiring, intending, including 
first-person intentional states. A first-person intentional state requires that 
one think of oneself in a first-person way-typically, in English, with the 
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pronouns "!," "me," and "mine.'" To use an example from Castaneda, 
who brought this point to the fore, when Castaneda thinks that he (him-
self) is the Editor of Soul, he expresses his thought by "I am the Editor of 
Soul," where this though is distinct from the thought that he would 
express by "Castaneda is the Editor of Soul," or liThe author of Thinking 
and Doing is the Editor of Soul." (Castai'teda may not know that he {him-
self} is the author of Thinking and Doing or even that he {himself} is 
Castaneda.) First-person intentional states are irreducible to third-person-
al intentional states. In order to be a person, any being must have first-per-
son intentional states.6 
A huml7n person is (at least for part of its existence) a biological entity-
a member of the species homo sl7piens--with a capacity for first-person 
intentional states. As a homo sapiens, a human person-Smith, say-must 
have a biological body that she can think of in a first-person way assum-
ing that there is a biological body of which Smith can think in a first-per-
son way, and that it is metaphysically impossible for anyone who is not 
Smith to think of that body in the first-person way, the capacity to think of 
that biological bodt in a first-person way individuates Smith and distin-
guishes her from every other metaphysically possible person. 
Let me elaborate a little on the idea of having the capacity to think of a 
biological body in the first-person way. Smith thinks of a biological body 
in the first-person way if she can distinguish that body from all other bod-
ies without aid of a name or description or third-personal pronoun. When 
Smith thinks of the pain in her head in the first-person way, she needs no 
name (e.g., "Smith") or description (e.g., "person with the biggest head in 
the room") or third-person pronoun (e.g., "her") to identify the person 
whose head is in question. Smith's wishing that the pain in her head 
would go away is not the same as wishing that the pain in Smith's head 
would go away, or that the pain in the largest head in the room would go 
away. Although "capacity" is a vague term, in saying that human persons 
must have the capacity to think of themselves in the first-personal way, I 
mean not to exclude, say a person in an irreversible coma: If one has ever 
thought of her body in the first-person way (and has not yet died), she has 
the capacity fo think of her body in the first-person way. (If there is no life 
after death, then the capacity to think of one's body in the first-person 
way is forever extinguished at death.) Hereafter, I'll drop reference to the 
capacity for intentional states, and say that one "has" a particular inten-
tional state if she has ever had it. 
x is a human person in virtue of having intentional states, some of 
which make first-person reference to a biological body. (I am not claiming 
that all of a human person's first-person intentional states make reference 
to a body. The thoughts that a human expressed by saying, 'Tm lonely," 
or ''I'm in debt," or "I just cannot stop thinking of you" do not refer to a 
body; rather, there would be no human to think those thoughts without a 
body.) x is the particular person she is-·Smith, say- in virtue of a whole 
cluster of properties peculiar to her. Some of these properties are psycho-
logical (for example, having certain memories, desires, fears, and other 
attitudes); some are moral (being generous, refusing to pay taxes); some 
are-for want of a better word-behavioral (being introverted, being a 
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braggart); some are more-or-Iess physical (having a limp, being allergic to 
nuts). Many of these properties can be exemplified only by someone in a 
particular linguistic, social and physical environment. They are manifest-
ed in the ways that she behaves in various circumstances, in the ways that 
she presents herself, in what she takes for granted, in her self-deceptions, 
her habits, preferences, and attitudes; her nervous tics, gait, gestures, and 
so on through the motley of features that make her the person she is and 
allow others to recognize her as Smith. Smith's features may be construed 
in a fine-grained way: It is not only that Smith is considerate, but that she 
consistently remembers Old Lady Jones's birthday; not only that she 
wants to project an image of success, but that she buys all her clothes from 
Eileen Fischer. Of course, Smith's features can change radically, while 
Smith remains Smith: Perhaps she starts buying all her clothes at L.L. 
Bean, or converts to Christianity, or she wins the lottery, or she discovers 
that she has cancer-and she is deeply altered-but she can never com-
pletely escape her past. (As Faulkner said, "The past is not dead. It's not 
even past.") 
The features in virtue of which a particular human person is Smith can 
be instantiated only by a bodily being. Smith's peculiar smile, for exam-
ple, depends on Smith's having a certain kind of body. Moreover, the fea-
tures in question are, for the most part, intentional and relational. The way 
that Smith treats her less able students, the way that she responds to 
appeals from charities, the precautions she takes when she travels 
abroad-these and many more of Smith's defining features cannot be 
exhibited by any being (even a bodily being) in splendid isolation. So, 
even apart from consideration of first-person reference to her body, there 
is no question of Smith's being a disembodied soul. In the absence of a 
body, there would be no Smith. 
It is necessary that Smith have a body, but is not necessary that Smith 
have the particular body that she actually has. Although the question of 
personal identity over time is a vexed one, it is clear that a person's body 
changes continually. Smith's body today may have no cells in common 
with Smith's body twenty years ago, but Smith remains Smith. Although I 
cannot say what the relation is between Smith's body now and Smith's 
body twenty years ago, I do think that we allow that Smith can persist 
through great bodily changes-perhaps even gradual replacement of her 
organic parts with bionic parts-provided that her intentional states 
remain intact.". To allow for this possibility, let me amend my characteri-
zation of a human person: Rather than requiring that some of Smith's 
intentional states make first-person reference to a biological body, let me 
say that Smith's intentional states make first-person reference to a biologi-
cal body, or to some body suitably related to a biological body, where I leave it 
empty just what the suitable relation is. The point of this rather uninfor-
mative amendment is to leave open the possibility that Smith could exist 
without having the body that she now has, without leaving open the pos-
sibility that Smith could exist without any body at all. 
If a human person is not identical to an immaterial soul, nor is a human 
person a composite of a material body and an immaterial mind, what, 
then, is the relation between a human person, Smith, and the biological 
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body, b, to which she makes first-person reference? The answer, which I 
share with certain so-called nonreductive materialists, is that persons are 
constituted by bodies, but are not identical to bodies. 
Consider an analogy: In certain respects, Smith is to her biological 
body, b, as Michelangelo's David is to a particular hunk of marble, h. Is the 
relation between David and h (or between Smith and b) one of identity? 
No. David is not identical to h. h could have existed in a world without art; 
in such a world, David would not have existed. For there are no statues or 
any other artwork in such a world. David could not exist without having 
certain intentional properties; but h could exist without having those 
intentional properties. Similarly, Smith could not exist without having cer-
tain intentional properties; but b could exist without having those inten-
tional properties. As already noted, many of the properties that make 
Smith the person she is depend on her being embedded in a linguistic, 
social and physical environment. So, the relation between Smith and her 
body is not one of identity. 
Let me contrast this "constitution" view of persons and bodies with 
alternative views. The "constitution" view is not a form of mind/body 
dualism. A statue is not a hunk of marble plus some other entity. Both 
persons and statues are particulars constituted by material objects; but 
each is the thing it is (a person, a statue) in virtue of its intentionally-speci-
fied relational properties." Smith is no more a composite of two kinds of 
entities than is Michelangelo's David. 
Nor is the relation between Smith and her body one of supervenience. 
Supervenience is a relation between (families of) properties. Again, the 
example of the statue and the hunk of marble is instructive: What makes 
something a statue are not the intrinsic properties of the hunk of marble 
that constitutes it, but rather its relations, intentionally specified, to other 
things-perhaps to the artist's intentions, perhaps to an artworld, perhaps 
to something else. So, since instantiation of all the intrinsic properties of 
the hunk of marble does not guarantee instantiation of the property of 
being a statue, the property of being a statue does not supervene on the 
(intrinsic) physical properties of the hunk of marble-any more than the 
property of being a contract supervenes on the (intrinsic) physical proper-
ties of the paper in which it is written. Similarly, the property of being a 
human person does not supervene on the intrinsic physical properties of 
the body. 
Let me emphasize that this rejection of supervenience does not rest on 
any theological considerations. For theism is compatible with metaphysi-
cal theories of supervenience. One could even hold that all properties 
supervene on microphysical properties in Jaegwon Kim's strong sense 
and still be a theist. As long as all of God's interventions in the natural 
order remained at the level of microphysical properties-basic properties, 
which, according to supervenience views, determine all other property 
instantiations-supervenience is not violated.lO My rejection of 
person/body supervenience rather concerns the fact that relational and 
intentional properties are required for a person to be a person, but not for 
a body to be a body. 
Finally, contrast the view that persons are constituted by their bodies to 
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the view that persons are identical to their bodies. A person/body identity 
theorist may say, "David is identical to h. Since h could exist in a world 
without art, and h is David, then David could exist in a world without art. 
Of course, in a world without art, David would not be a statue, but the very 
thing that is a statue in our world, h, exists in a world without art." The 
person/body identity theorist may continue: "Now let b' be Smith's body 
b after Smith's death; b' could exist in another possible world in which 
there were no persons at all (nothing in that world had ever had intention-
al states), and hence in that world, b' had never been a person. So, assum-
ing that Smith is identical to b, in a world without persons, the very thing 
that in our world is (or was) a person, b', exists but is not a person."" 
Hence, the identity of Smith and her body still holds, and, the 
person/body identity theorist may claim, the argument that Smith is not 
identical to her body, but is only constituted by it, should be rejected. 
I have several responses to the person/body identity theorist here. 
First, the argument that I have put into the mouth of the person/body 
identity theorist should not convince anyone to hold the identity theory 
since its force depends on having already accepted the identity theory. For 
"Smith is identical to b' (as well as 'David is identical to h') occurs as a 
premise in the argument. Second, the person/body identity theorist's 
argument has, to my ears at least, highly counterintuitive consequences-
about the referents of names and about the first-person perspective. 
In the first place, the person/body identity theory requires that David 
name the hunk of marble (whether it is a statue or not); for according to 
the person/body identity theorist's argument, Dal'id and Smith both exist 
in worlds without, respectively, statues and persons. Of course, they 
would not be called 'Dmlid' or 'Smith' in such worlds, but on the identity 
theory, those very individuals exist in such worlds. It seems to me, on the 
contrary, that 'David' names a particular statue, not the marble that consti-
tutes it; and 'Smith' names a particular person, not the body that consti-
tutes it-just as 'The Mona Lisa' names a particular painting and not the 
canvas that constitutes it. Therefore, I do not think we should say that 
Smith exists in a world without persons, or that David exists in a world 
without statues. In our world, we need not distinguish between the statue 
and h as the referent of the name 'David,' or between the person and b as 
the referent of the name 'Smith.' But, in other possible worlds, I think that 
the names 'David' and 'Smith' should "track" the statue and the person, 
respectively-and not the material objects that constitute them in the actu-
al world. So, the first counterintuitive consequence of the person/body 
identity theorist's argument concerns the referents of names. 
The second counterintuitive consequence of the identity theorist's argu-
ment can be seen by considering the first-person point of view. If the per-
son/body identity theorist is right, then Smith (or any of us) could truly 
say, "Being me (this very thing) does not require that I be a person. I could 
have existed-me, the very individual that I am-without ever having 
had any intentional states at all. That individual, who never had any 
intentional states, could have been me." This consequence is hard for me 
to swallow. I can imagine myself to be otherwise than I am in many 
ways-I could have been homeless, I could have been a lawyer, I could 
496 Faith and Philosophy 
have been deaf, and so on-but I cannot imagine myself as having no 
intentional states at all. I can imagine that my life had been quite different, 
but I cannot imagine that I existed without having any conscious life at all. 
The person/body identity theorist will accept these consequences-
that names track bodies (not persons) across worlds, and that you could 
have existed without ever having been a person-but the rest of us need 
not. The difference between the person/body identity theorist and me 
here can be seen as an example of one philosopher's modus ponens' being 
another philosopher's modus tollens. Both the person/body identity theo-
rist and I agree on this conditional: 
If the person/body identity theory is correct, then it is not the case 
that persons are essentially persons. 
The person/body identity theorist holds that persons are not essential-
ly persons, and accepts the consequences. Since I think that persons are 
essentially persons (i.e., if x is a person, then it is impossible that x exist 
and not be a person), I conclude that the person/body identity theory is 
incorrect. In any case, there is no reason to be moved by an argument for 
rejecting the "constitution" view of persons and bodies in favor of the 
"identity" view that takes the person/body identity theory to be a 
premise. 
To sum up this nondualistic conception of a human person: If Smith is 
a human person, then Smith has intentional states, some of which make 
first-person reference to a biological body, or to a body suitably related to 
a biological body, where the relation between Smith and the body to 
which she makes first-person reference is constitution. This nondualistic 
conception is not a denial that there are souls. 'Soul' is the name given to 
the properties that make someone the person she is. Just as a belief is not 
an inner state of some organ, so a soul is not an inner entity. To know one-
self is to know a human person in her full concreteness in a first-person 
way; it is not to know a private entity "inside," inaccessible to others. You 
know your own mind when you have correct second-order beliefs about 
your first-order intentional states. To be self-interested is not to care exces-
sively about a private object, but to act on behalf of the interests of a cer-
tain person. Of course, I think that you have a soul; otherwise, I wouldn't 
think that you are a person. It is just that to say that you have a soul is not 
to say that your soul is a concrete particular: You-in your full bodily 
being-are the concrete particular; your soul is that cluster of properties 
that makes you the person you are. 
This conception of a human person is "naturalistic" in a broad sense: it 
neither invokes nor presupposes the existence of immaterial souls or 
supernatural beings. The intentional states and the first-person perspec-
tive required for something to be a person are just as likely to be products 
of natural selection as is the organization of human brains. This concep-
tion of a human person rests comfortably with materialism about the nat-
ural order; and if the natural order is aU that there is, then it rests comfort-
ably with materialism tout court. The conception avoids mind/body dual-
ism, but should it be acceptable to a Christian? 
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The Christian Doctrine of Resurrection 
It is undeniable that natural human life is bodily existence. We are 
earthy, of dust. The question is whether Christian belief requires that a 
human person also have an immaterial part that is detachable from any 
constituting body. I now want to focus on a traditional Christian doc-
trine-the doctrine of the Resurrection of the dead-and show that the 
nondualistic conception of human persons is consistent with several inter-
pretations of the doctrine. I have never swum in theological waters before, 
and I fear that I am already over my head. But here goes. 
Christians who recite the Apostles' Creed say: "I believe in ... the resur-
rection of the body and the life everlasting." Explicit Christian doctrine 
concerns resurrection of the body, not immortality of an immaterial soul.12 
Nevertheless, we may ask whether the doctrine of resurrection of the 
body entails that human beings have immaterial souls that can exist inde-
pendently of any body. Matters of entailment are tricky here, because on 
any interpretation, resurrection can be accomplished only through divine 
agency. Indeed, Christian doctrine is different from the Greek conception 
of immortality (e.g., in the Phaedo) on just this point; on the Greek concep-
tion, the soul is naturally immortal; on the Christian conception, everlast-
ing life is a gracious gift of God. So, to refer to divine agency in the doc-
trine of resurrection is not to import a deus ex machina. Rather, divine 
agency lies at the heart of the doctrine. This is what makes matters of 
entailment tricky. For the infinite attributes that make possible divine 
agency cannot be understood in the same way as finite attributes. Since I 
have little confidence in my ability to understand what is "required" for 
divine agency, I approach the topic of whether the doctrine of resurrection 
entails that there be an immaterial soul with great tentativeness. 
Before exploring the question of whether the doctrine of resurrection 
entails mind/body dualism, let me make explicit some assumptions: (i) 
The doctrine of resurrection does entail that an individual can exist with-
out the biological body that she was born with, and, indeed, without any 
"fleshly" body at all. (But the flesh/spirit distinction, so prominent in 
Pauline writings, is decidedly not a mind/body distinction. Sometimes 
Paul subsumes the whole person under the "flesh" side of the distinction, 
and other times under the "spirit" side of the distinction.)n (ii) The doc-
trine of resurrection asserts a personal afterlife (not some merging with 
the infinite, in which one's individuality is extinguished); if the doctrine is 
correct, then Smith herself-that very person-lives after death. If Smith's 
life after death-a life of that same individual, not a replica-entailed that 
Smith have an immaterial soul that can exist apart from any body, then 
Christian doctrine, as I understand it, would require mind/body dualism. 
And the answer to the question-Need a Christian be a mind/body dual-
ist?-would be "yes." 
Now the question of reidentification of the person is a serious philo-
sophical problem: In virtue of what is a future individual Smith, and not 
just a replica of Smith? I confess that I cannot say; but let me offer two 
considerations to mitigate criticism of my ignorance. First, the problem of 
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reidentification is a serious general problem about personal identity, apart 
from theological considerations. Even concerning identity in the here and 
now, there is no consensus among materialists. Personal identity over 
time is a problem for everyone, not just for Christians. Second, 
mind/body dualism offers no illumination on the problem of reidentifica-
tion. There is a least as much difficulty in coming up with criteria for rei-
dentifying immaterial souls as for reidentifying bodies. So, a dualist 
would have no advantage over a nondualist with respect to reidentifica-
tion of Smith. Since my aim is to show that a Christian need not be a 
mind/body dualist, and since nondualism fares no worse than dualism 
vis a vis the problem of reidentification, and since there is no consensus 
on reidentification of persons even in the pre-resurrection world, I shall 
put aside the issue here. 
Finally, let me distinguish two ways that we use the term 'alive.' 
Restricting the domain of discourse to persons, if we construe 'x is alive' 
to entail that x has biological properties (e.g., has DNA), then a believer in 
a personal afterlife can agree that being alive is a contingent property of 
persons. If we construe 'x is alive' to entail nothing about biological prop-
erties per se, but only to entail that x has whatever properties are required 
for x to enjoy, say, conscious experience, then the believer in a personal 
afterlife should take being alive to be an essential property of persons-
but, since corpses abound, being alive would not be an essential property 
of human bodies. If we construe 'being alive' in this latter sense of having 
whatever properties are required for conscious experience, and if there is 
a personal afterlife, then the property of being alive is realized in two dif-
ferent ways for human beings-in natural properties before death and in 
supernatural properties after death. '4 
Now I want to try to show that the nondualistic conception of human 
persons just sketched is compatible with various interpretations of the 
doctrine of resurrection. 
I. First, consider the doctrine that takes a general resurrection to be a 
temporal event-an historical event that has not yet occurred, but will 
occur in the future---perhaps as the last temporal event. On this interpre-
tation, what happens to Smith between the time of Smith's death and the 
general resurrection when Smith will be raised? There seem to be two 
possible answers: either Smith exists in the interim in an "intermediate 
state," or Smith goes out of existence at death, and then, by God's grace, is 
brought back into existence at the general resurrection. 
Suppose, as many Christians do, that Smith exists in the interim 
between death and resurrection in an intermediate state. A number of 
Christian philosophers take such an intermediate state to be a disembod-
ied state. In that case, presumably, what exists during the interim is an 
immaterial soul that is Smith.'s Hence, Christians have supposed that the 
doctrine of the intermediate state entails mind/body dualism. But there is 
no reason to suppose that the intermediate state (if there is one) is one of 
disembodiment: an intermediate body is appropriate as the bearer of the 
properties that make Smith the person she is. (A person with a post-
mortem but pre-resurrection body intuitively could be said to be "asleep 
in Christ." It is difficult lfor me} to see how an immaterial soul could be 
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asleep.) The possibility of an intermediate body shows that the doctrine of 
the intermediate state does not entail mind/body dualism. 
Still considering the general resurrection to be a future historical event, 
the other apparent alternative is that there is no intermediate state, but 
that Smith (temporarily) does not exist in the interim. One version of the 
"temporal gap" view is that at the general resurrection, God reassembles 
the atoms that constituted Smith and restores the relationships that they 
bore to one another during Smith's natural life, and thereby "re-creates" 
Smith. This view is clearly compatible with a nondualistic conception of 
the human person. During the time that Smith does not exist, some of 
Smith's atoms still do, and they provide the basis for Smith's resurrection 
body to be a continuant of Smith's biological body. (We can trust in God's 
goodness not to make a plethora of bodies spatiotemporally continuous 
with Smith's biological body.) 
Peter van Inwagen has argued powerfully against a "re-assembly" ver-
sion of the temporal-gap view, on both logical and theological grounds. I 
can only discuss one example here. Van Inwagen argues that if an original 
manuscript of Augustine's had burned in 457, then nothing we have 
today could be that original manuscript by Augustine; God could have 
made a perfect duplicate of it, but the result of God's handiwork would 
not, could not, be the original manuscript. By analogy, if Smith's natural 
body were entirely destroyed, no reconstituted body could be Smith's. I 
agree about the original manuscript, for the property of having been 
inscribed by Augustine cannot obtain without the causal intervention of 
Augustine, but the "re-created" manuscript has its inscriptional properties 
without the causal intervention of Augustine. 16 What makes it the case 
that a certain piece of paper is an original manuscript by Augustine is that 
Augustine inscribed it: it has a particular origin; without that origin 
(which requires Augustine's causal intervention), a piece of paper is not 
Augustine's original manuscriptY But the case of resurrection is different: 
Although God could not simply will that a certain manuscript have the 
property of having been inscribed by Augustine without involving 
Augustine, He could simply will (it seems to me) there to be a body that 
has the complexity to "subserve" Smith's characteristic states, and that is 
suitably related to Smith's biological body, to constitute Smith. (The bio-
logical Smith's de re attitudes become the resurrected Smith's memories of 
de re attitudes. The biological Smith's timidity becomes the resurrected 
Smith's memory of timidity; the biological Smith's lovingkindness 
remains the resurrected Smith's lovingkindness, and so on.) If creation of 
a resurrected body is within the power of God at all, it seems to me equal-
ly in His power to produce the conditions necessary for the body to con-
stitute Smith, where what makes Smith the person she is are her character-
istic intentional states, including first-person reference to her body." The 
fact that a certain resurrection body would not exist without the direct 
intervention of God is irrelevant to whether or not it was Smith's body-
just as the fact that a certain bionic body would not exist without the 
direct intervention of scientists and surgeons is irrelevant to whether or 
not it is Smith's body. 
Another kind of temporal-gap conception can be developed, I think, 
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from the views of Thomas Aquinas. Suppose, as Aristotle and Aquinas 
held, that the soul is the form of the body; also suppose, as Aristotle held 
but Aquinas did not, that the soul cannot exist apart from the body. So 
when Smith dies, she ceases to be actual. But Smith may still exist poten-
tially: As I understand Aquinas, he thought that Smith's soul could exist 
apart from Smith's body, but that Smith's soul was not Smith, but a rem-
nant or truncated version of Smith; a disembodied soul is Smith's soul in 
virtue of the fact that it has the potential to be reunited to a body that 
would reconstitute Smith." If this is Aquinas's view, then it would seem 
that in the interim between Smith's death and resurrection, Smith's soul 
actually exists, but Smith herself-the person-exists only potentially. 
What I am suggesting as a temporal-gap view is that not even a remnant 
of Smith is actual during the period between Smith's death and resurrec-
tion. Smith-body and soul-remains only a potential being, to be reactu-
ali zed at the resurrection.(This would not violate Locke's dictum that 
nothing can begin to exist at two different times: the resurrection is not a 
beginning of Smith's existence but a resumption or restoration of it.)20 I'm 
not sure whether such a view is coherent; but if it is, then it too would be 
compatible with a nondualistic conception of the human person. 
Even if the nondualistic conception of human persons is compatible 
with temporal-gap versions of the doctrine of resurrection, temporal-gap 
versions may themselves be theologically unacceptable. Temporal-gap 
versions, according to which there is some interval between Smith's death 
and resurrection during which Smith herself does not exist, may raise 
problems for the doctrine of purgatory <this is a difficulty only for those 
who hold a doctrine of purgatory, of course). The intermediate-state ver-
sions, by contrast, make room for purgatory between death and final res-
urrection. My point here, however, is only this: A nondualistic conception 
of the human person is compatible with the doctrine of resurrection in 
either an intermediate-state version or a temporal-gap version. 
II. There is yet another way to construe the doctrine of resurrection, 
and that is to deny that the general resurrection is a temporal event at all. 
In that case, it would not be a future event-an event that will occur at 
some future time-but rather it would reside in the realm of eternity. If 
the general resurrection is eschatological in the sense of being out of the 
temporal realm altogether, there need be no period of "wait-time" 
between Smith's death and her resurrection, and hence no intermediate 
state or temporal gap in a person's existence. At death, perhaps, a person 
would pass over into eternity. Perhaps supernatural bodies are to natural 
bodies as eternity is to physical time {whatever that relation is).21 I take 
prominent Protestant theologians, like Karl Barth, to have held this view. 
Although Barth himself may have been a mind/body dualist, his view of 
resurrection does not compel him to be one. 
Suppose that a nondualistic conception of the human person is logical-
ly consistent with acceptable interpretations of the doctrine of resurrec-
tion. So what? Nonphilosophers, in my experience, don't give a fig for log-
ical possibility. Nonphilosophers, and even some philosophers, want to 
know what the truth actually is, not just what it could be. And for all that I 
have said about the doctrine of resurrection, mind/body dualism may 
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still be true. Right. But there are other, to my mind compelling, reasons 
not to be a mind/body dualist. So, I think that if a Christian need not be a 
mind/body dualist, she should not be a mind/body dualist. 
Against Mind/Body Dualism 
I think that there are both theological and philosophical reasons to 
oppose mind/body dualism. Since philosophical reasons to reject 
mind/body dualism are well-known, I shall mention only theological or 
quasi-theological reasons to affirm nondualism about human persons. It 
seems to me that a nondualistic conception of human persons best accords 
with the picture of human persons presented throughout the Jewish and 
Christian Bibles. If mind/body dualism were Scriptural, I would expect 
the doctrine to be suggested in accounts of the resurrection of Christ. But 
the resurrection appearances of Christ are all bodily, with no hint of 
mind/body (or soul/body) dualism. After death, Christ underwent some 
kind of bodily transformation-He was not recognized by those closest to 
him right away; but was recognized eventually-but not loss of body alto-
gether. Although I take ordinary humans to be essentially bodily (created 
that way by God), and I take it that the Word became flesh, I do not think 
that God is a material being. I understand Christ's resurrection appear-
ances to be the model for understanding the resurrection of human per-
son, not for understanding God in His divinity. Hence, for a Christian, the 
fact that Christ appeared bodily is significant for the conception of human 
persons. On the whole, the picture of human nature afforded by both the 
Old and New Testaments, seems to me best understood as nondualistic: a 
human is a psychosomatic unity.22 But I am not an authority on the Bible 
and shall not pursue this matter here. 
A second at least quasi-theological reason for rejecting mind/body 
dualism concerns the character of God's creation. Nature, as I see it, is a 
unified whole with its own internal integrity; and human persons are a 
part of nature. According to Christian belief, human beings (by nature, of 
dust) are capable of redemption (and in this respect made in the image of 
God); but redemption comes from outside the realm of nature through 
God's grace. Nature may be perfected and fulfilled by grace, but grace is 
not a component of nature. Mind/body dualism introduces an unneeded 
bifurcation into the realm of nature. The real dualism-the theologically 
important dualism-is not internal to nature at alL It is the dualism 
between nature and grace, between creation and the Creator, between the 
natural and the supernatural. A Christian who rejects mind/body dual-
ism need not, and should not, reject this larger dualism. 
A materialist will note gleefully that I have just endorsed dualism with 
a vengeance: I have merely traded mind/body dualism for a supernatur-
al/natural dualism. After all, resurrected bodies are as mysterious to us as 
immaterial souls. So the apparent gain in rejecting mind/body dualism, 
an atheist may urge, is only a terminological mask. To this objection, I 
should reply: The philosophically important difference is that resurrected 
bodies are not part of the natural order; but if mind/body dualism were 
true, natural phenomena, here and now, would be mysterious: resurrec-
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tion may be tolerable as a mystery, but Smith's deciding not to shoplift 
should not be. Indeed, on mind/body dualism, natural phenomena 
would become mysterious in ways that most contemporary people think 
that they are not. 
By conceiving of the natural world as an integrated whole, and not as a 
conjunction of two fundamentally different kinds of things-mind and 
matter-the nondualist conceives of nature as susceptible to human inves-
tigation. Nothing in the natural order, not even mentality, is inherently 
unsuitable for natural inquiry.2' Perhaps the natural world is too complex 
for human beings ultimately to comprehend-perhaps, perhaps not. But 
we cannot tell a priori. This nondualistic view of nature accords theologi-
cally and philosophically with the way that I take the natural order to be. 
So, a human person is essentially a bodily being. It is in virtue of the 
instantiation of certain intentional properties that a human person exists-
whether instantiation of those properties came about through natural 
selection or not. A Christian need not claim that these properties are any 
more supernatural than biochemical properties. 
Conclusion 
It may seem the height of presumption to go against the dualistic 
strains in the Christian tradition. Let me plead that I am not simply reject-
ing the tradition; there are many matters on which the wisdom of 
ancients-Augustine, say, on moral psychology-is unsurpassed. On the 
other hand, I do not think that philosophy, even Christian philosophy, 
should be elevated to a matter of faith. And I think that what we now 
know about nature renders untenable the idea of a human person as con-
sisting, even in part, of an immaterial soul capable of independent exis-
tence. 
I would like to conclude with some remarks on method: Although I 
think that philosophy and theology are extremely difficult, I think that it is 
relatively easy to have philosophical positions that square with Scripture, 
because I think that many different philosophical positions are consistent 
with the scant clues to be found in the Bible. Depending on how one 
understands sleep, to say that people are "asleep in Christ" is consistent 
with an intermediate state, with a temporal gap (nonexistence which is 
thought of as dreamless sleep) and with disembodied existence accompa-
nied by vivid experiences as in dreams. To say that "We shall all be 
changed" is likewise consistent with a variety of views on the resurrec-
tion. Augustine was a great philosopher; Aquinas was a great philoso-
pher, but I do not think that Paul (or Jesus) was a philosopher at all. The 
Bible can be used by Christian philosophers as a test against which to 
measure their views, and it can be used to suggest topics for philosophical 
discussion. But I do not think that there is a unique Christian philosophy 
that is authoritative for all Christians. Philosophers, perhaps most of all, 
should not forget that now we only see through a glass darkly." 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
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NOTES 
1. Aquinas's view is nuanced and not easy to pin down. "Therefore, 
since the human soul, insofar as it is united to the body as a form, also has 
its existence raised above the body and does not depend on it, it is clear that 
the soul is established on the borderline between corporeal and separate 
[i.e., purely spiritual] substances." Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on 
the SOlll Ie, quoted by Norman Kretzmann, "Philosophy of Mind," in Thc 
Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, 
eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 136. 
2. See my Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
3. See Explaining Attitudcs, Chapter Six. 
4. The ways in which actions are related to motions of various parts of 
the body are complicated; and 1 cannot deal with that topic here, except to 
say that what is morally, legally, socially important are intentional actions, 
not bodily motions. For philosophers of mind, bodily motions hold philo-
sophical interest only insofar as they serve action. 
5. First-personal states do not require what might be called "Cartesian 
privacy." Philosophers such as Dewey, Sartre, and George Herbert Mead 
construe first-personal states as dependent on social context. 
6. Hector-Neri Castaneda argued for the irreducibility of the first-person 
perspective to a third-person perspective in several publications, beginning 
with "He: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness" Ratio 8 (1966): 130-157. 
See also his "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators" in the American Philosophical 
Quarterly 4 (1967): 85-100. For a study of philosophy from the first-personal 
point of view, see Gareth B. Matthews, Thought's Ego in Augustine and 
Descartes (ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). In "Why Computers 
Can't Act," (AmcriCllIl Philosophical Quarterly 18 {1981}: 157-163), I argued that 
a first-person perspective was required in order to form intentions. 
7. Or at least some part of it, in the case of Siamese Twins. 
8. Bruce Aune makes a similar pointin Metaphysics: The Elements 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985): 94-95. 
9. This formulation leaves open the possibility of reducing intentional 
properties to nonintentional properties. 
10. This point emerged in a conversation with Richard Boyd. 
11. The argument that I am putting in the mouth of the person/body 
identity theorist has affinities with arguments given by Fred Feldman. 
Feldman focuses on the property of being alive, which he argues is only a 
contingent property of the things (bodies) that have it. See his Confrontations 
with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Valuc of Death (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
12. See Oscar Cullman, "Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the 
Dead? The Witness of the New Testament," in Terence Penelhum, ed., 
Immortality (Belmont CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company: 1973): 53-85. (1 
am grateful to Thomas Senor for bringing this work to my attention.) 
13. E.g., "For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the 
things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds 
on the things of the Spirit. To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set 
the mind on the Spirit is life and peace. For this reason the mind that is set 
on the flesh is hostile to God; it does not submit to God's law- indeed, it 
cannot, and those who are in the flesh cannot please God." Romans 8:5-8. 
14. I say "Natural" rather than "biological" here to allow for the replace-
ment of Smith's biological body by a bionic body. 
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15. A number of philosophers argue in this vein. For an extended argu-
ment for mind/body dualism based on the doctrine of the intermediate 
state, see John W. Cooper, Body, Soul and Life Everlasting (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989). 
16. I assume that we are imagining that the hypothetical manuscript was 
actually produced by Augustine, not merely dictated. If it were imagined to 
have been dictated, then Augustine's causal role in the first manuscript 
would not seem all that different from Augustine's causal role in God's later 
re-creation. 
17. Identity conditions for different kinds of things are different-and 
usually vague and unspecifiable. Identity conditions for some things do not 
include properties about their origin. If a licensed repairman takes my 
squeaky lawnmower apart, oils all the parts and reassembles them exactly 
as before, I think that I still have myoid lawnmower. (If I asked for a 
replacement of my mower, the repairman would laugh and remind me that 
my warranty was still good on the original one that he returned to me.) 
18. For further arguments, see Peter van Inwagen, "The Possibility of 
Resurrection," in Immortality, Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1992): 242-246. 
19. This interpretation is Peter Geach's: On Aquinas's conception, "a 
soul is not the person who died but a mere remnant of him.:" The individu-
ality of a disembodied soul is grounded in the claim that "each disembodied 
human soul permanently retained a capacity for reunion to such a body as 
would reconstitute a man identifiable with the man who died." Peter Geach, 
God and the Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969): 22-23. Kenny 
quotes Aquinas as follows: The "soul, since it is part of the body of a human 
being, is not a whole human being." Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on I. Cor. 
15, quoted by Anthony Kenny, The Self (The Aquinas Lecture, 1988) 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1988): 27. Copleston comments 
about Aquinas's view: "And though the human soul survives death, it is not 
strictly speaking a human person when it is in a state of rational nature." F. 
e. Copleston, Aquinas (Baltimore MD: Penquine Books, 1955): 160. 
20. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II. 
21. See, for example, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 
"Eternity," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 429-458. 
22. See Stephen T. Davis, Riscn Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection 
(Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1993): 47. 
23. I say "natural inquiry" rather than "science," because, for reasons 
unrelated to this paper, I believe that scientific inquiry is played out against 
a common-sensical background that is not itself regimentable into scientific 
theory. 
24. I owe a great debt to Katherine Sonderegger and to Gareth B. 
Matthews for helping me with this work. I was helped by discussions with 
Edmund Gettier and Fred Feldman. Thanks also are due to Ted Warfield 
and to Eleonore Stump, who commented on versions of this paper read at 
the Notre Dame Conference on the Philosophy of Mind, November 4, 1994, 
and at the meeting of the Society for Christian Philosophers in Boston, 
December 27, 1994, respectively. 
